  
June 23, 1961

Honorable Henry M. Jackson  
Chairman, Subcommittee on National  
Policy Machinery  
United States Senate  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Jackson:

It was thoughtful of you to send me an  
advance copy of your Subcommittee's report on  
science organization and the President's Office.

I have looked this over with much  
interest and have forwarded it to some of my  
people here who, I am sure, will also find it  
interesting.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

**SIGNED**

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

O/DCI/AWD:at

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(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 20, 87TH CONGRESS)

11-4946

June 15, 1961


The Honorable Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

I am enclosing an advance copy of our Subcommittee staff report on science organization and the President's Office which I think will be of interest to you.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,



Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.  
Chairman, Subcommittee on  
National Policy Machinery

Enclosure

HOLD FOR RELEASE

MON JUN 19 1961 AM

87th Congress }  
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

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SCIENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE  
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

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A STUDY  
SUBMITTED TO THE  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
BY ITS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY  
MACHINERY  
(Pursuant to S. Res. 20, 87th Cong.)



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

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WASHINGTON : 1961

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## FOREWORD

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Free institutions are now being challenged by resourceful and implacable adversaries. Their aim is no less than to write finish to freedom. As Mr. Robert Lovett told our Subcommittee:

If the public statement "we will bury you" does not carry the message to us, then words have lost their meaning.

In today's world, the tide of political power flows with the tide of scientific and technical power. A decade ago we took our nation's scientific and technical leadership almost for granted. Today it is being effectively contested.

We must bestir ourselves, lest Sputnik and the Cosmonaut mark only the beginning of a long list of Soviet firsts, and lest we fall short of our best in putting science to work for peace and welfare and individual freedom.

From the start of its nonpartisan study of how our government can best organize to formulate and carry out foreign and defense policy, the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery has given close attention to the impact of science and technology on national policy-making.

In April 1960, the subcommittee held a series of hearings, entitled "Science, Technology, and the Policy Process." During these hearings the subcommittee took detailed testimony from James A. Perkins, vice president of the Carnegie Corp.; James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone Laboratories; William H. Pickering, Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology; Ruben F. Mettler, executive vice president, Space Technology Laboratories, Inc.; Eugene P. Wigner, professor of mathematical physics, Princeton University; Edward M. Purcell, Nobel Prize winner and professor of physics, Harvard University; Herbert F. York, first Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

The subcommittee staff has profited from discussions and interviews with over 50 distinguished scientists and Government officials who have lived and worked with this problem. The list of those consulted includes scientists familiar with problems of top-level science organization, departmental technical experts, Nobel Prize winners, and outstanding authorities on science and the policy process.

This, the fifth in a series of subcommittee staff reports, makes certain suggestions for improving science organization at the summit of our Government.

HENRY M. JACKSON,

*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.*

JUNE 14, 1961.

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## ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

### SCIENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

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#### THE PRESIDENT'S PROBLEM

The continued high standing of our nation in the world demands that we maintain scientific and technological leadership. The state of our military defenses, our success in attaining our foreign policy objectives, the health and productivity of our economy—all depend in large measure upon making wise use of science and its applications.

The President bears the main responsibility for determining the broad direction and scale of the government's part in our national scientific effort. He establishes the priorities. He makes the key decisions that enlist science and technology in support of our foreign policy and defense goals. He is ultimately responsible for the wise employment of the over eight billion dollars our federal government now spends annually on research and development.

The President's task is formidable.

Eight departments and agencies support major technical programs, and almost all other parts of the government use science in varying degrees to help meet their agency objectives. This diffusion of science and technology throughout the government is not a sign of untidy administrative housekeeping. Rather, it reflects the very nature of science itself. Organizationally, science is not a definable jurisdiction. Like economics, it is a tool. It is an instrument for accomplishing things having nothing to do with science. Dr. James Fisk, President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, put it this way to the Subcommittee:

To imagine that "science" as a whole could be abstracted from government departments and agencies and set up somehow as a separate department—a Department of Science—is, I believe, unrealistic. It would be somewhat analogous to abstracting "economics" from these departments and agencies and forming a Department of Economics.

It is a fact of life that many departments and agencies must conduct extensive technical activities. The President and his top assistants will always face the difficult problem of ordering and focusing these necessarily scattered programs.

Planning ahead in science is no less difficult. Scientific research, by its very nature, is uncertain in outcome. Ten years ago, the prevailing view held the intercontinental ballistic missile of little military value. The air-breathing missile was slated to supplant the jet bomber. Yet today, the ballistic missile is relegating air-breathers to museums. The unforeseen roadblock, the unexpected shortcut, and the element of sheer caprice in research will always do violence to precise schedules and targets. The record of attempts to read the

scientific future is notoriously poor. There is no Supreme Court of Science except the testing ground of nature itself.

This means that the President cannot afford to rely upon any one source of scientific advice. No single scientist, no one group, nor even the scientific community as a whole can be counted upon to foresee the unfolding course of research and technology. Even the most distinguished experts are from time to time bound to be wrong.

The proper use of scientific counsel poses further problems. Scientists are professional experts. Their technical judgments within their specialties merit closest heed. But as Mr. James Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation warned the Subcommittee:

. . . we are inclined to translate important special authority into authority in general. A specialist on atomic energy does not necessarily speak with equal authority on infrared devices or jet propulsion. Even less does he speak with authority on problems of strategic deterrence or on the probable outcome of the cold war.

We are in some danger, it seems to me, of repeating the mistakes of the thirties when the fears of depression produced an overvaluation of the general skills of the economist.

Scientists often have strong opinions about the morality or political utility of developments in the laboratory. They are not exempt from the human tendency to allow these beliefs to color their technical judgments, and to become ardent pleaders for special causes. A President needs as much sales resistance in science and technology as anywhere else.

Viewed from where the President sits, scientific counsel is inevitably parochial. It is only one of the many factors he must balance and weigh in arriving at policies covering the full span of our national needs. Measured against the perspectives of the President's office, scientific counsel is therefore like economic and military advice, and must in the same sense be subject to civilian control.

The President, in shaping and guiding our government's scientific and technical effort, is critically dependent upon able leadership and staffing within the departments and agencies. The departments are the great reservoirs of skill and experience; they are on the front line of decision-making; they have the planning realism which comes from actual involvement in operating problems.

The range of agency technical activities is immense. It goes from space to sonar, from microbiology to meteorology, from symbolic logic to systems engineering. No one person in the government, nor any one committee of directors, can have detailed knowledge across the whole spectrum of science. The departmental experts in each field, together with their agency heads, must bear the main planning burden on programs related to their departmental missions.

At the same time, a President can be greatly helped by having his own above-the-department science advisers. They can give him counsel "in the round"—from a government-wide, rather than departmental, perspective. They can assist him in cross-agency coordination. They can alert him to promising developments lying outside of obvious agency missions and having no departmental home. They can call to his attention programs of high national priority, but low agency priority. They can help him in checking on agency performance.



ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISERS

Sputnik was a turning point in the history of government science organization. It brought science into the inner councils of the Presidency. President Eisenhower established the post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. He also appointed a President's Science Advisory Committee. President Kennedy has continued the pattern inherited from his predecessor.

The Special Assistant and the Science Advisory Committee have become the nerve center of government science organization.

These Presidential-level science arrangements have now been tested by almost four years of experience. How have they worked? How can they be improved?

The Special Assistant and the Science Advisory Committee are the Chief Executive's own staff aides for science and technology. Their job is advising the President. Their duties are not formally defined.

The Special Assistant, in addition to being the President's personal science aide, has also served as chairman of the Science Advisory Committee, through election by its members. The Committee is composed of eighteen distinguished scientists from private life, serving on a part-time basis. A small staff supports the Special Assistant and the Committee.

The President's science advisers have worked in close cooperation with the departments carrying on substantial technical programs, particularly the Department of Defense. They have also worked intimately with the National Science Foundation and the Federal Council for Science and Technology. The Foundation stimulates basic research and scientific education, but is in addition formally charged with larger responsibilities for developing national scientific policies and evaluating research programs of other agencies. The Council, chaired by the President's Special Assistant, is an inter-agency coordinating committee for departmental scientific and technical programs.

The Special Assistant and the Science Advisory Committee are a novel feature in the organization of the Presidency. Although they are now part of the White House, they are not across-the-board, general purpose counsellors and political intimates of the President. Rather they are experts in one particular area. They give the President professional advice on scientific and technical questions. Their role is thus akin to that of the Council of Economic Advisers in its special field. In the main, their responsibilities are much more like those of officials in the Executive Office of the President than like those of typical aides in the White House itself.

The President's science advisers have made themselves useful to their chief in many ways:

They have been a scientific fire brigade. Two examples: At the outset they helped fill a vacuum created by the lack of a sufficiently strong research and development staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and they still concern themselves with a broad range of problems of military technology. They have also helped offset the failure of the Department of State to secure technical competence adequate for dealing with such problems as arms control,

nuclear test cessation, international scientific cooperation, NATO technical problems, and the like.

They have made recommendations to the President in the area of long-term scientific planning. Three cases in point: Oceanography, meteorology, and materials research.

They have assisted the President in coordinating important programs cutting across departmental lines. Atmospheric sciences provide an illustration.

They have served the President as technical auditors of certain ongoing agency programs. Their counsel has been given on project-starting and project-killing.

They have served in some areas as a technical staff for the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau itself has only a very small number of scientific experts on its own payroll.

Testimony and counsel given the Subcommittee clearly indicate that those who have served as Special Assistants and members of the Advisory Committee have rendered great service. The evidence also indicates that these arrangements can now be made into still more useful instruments of the Presidency.

*The President's science advisers have not yet fully occupied a "no man's land" in forward planning for science.*

In certain high priority areas the Special Assistant and the Science Advisory Committee have recommended steps for meeting long-term scientific needs. They have thus partly filled a gap left by the reluctance of the National Science Foundation to exercise the authority given it to "develop and encourage the pursuit of a national policy for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences" and to "recommend to the President policies for the federal government which will strengthen the national scientific effort . . . ."

The President's own science aides, however, have not been clearly charged with the initiative for sparking across-the-board forward planning. As a practical matter, in addition, they are not now staffed to handle the full span of scientific and technical planning problems requiring Presidential attention.

*The science advisers have not yet done enough in helping the President and the Bureau of the Budget coordinate and monitor major government technical programs.*

The President and the Bureau of the Budget, in auditing ongoing agency technical programs, now turn chiefly to the departments themselves in seeking technical counsel. Until recently, they also very largely relied upon departmental technical advice in coordinating activities cutting across agency lines.

The President and the Bureau, where major questions are at issue, can profit greatly by having a ready source of above-the-department technical advice. A President needs the protection of more than one channel of technical counsel. Also, departmental experts may become over-committed to their own agency program objectives. Program protagonists are not necessarily good program critics.

While the science advisers now give their chief and the Bureau of the Budget technical counsel in a number of areas, this Presidential-level staff assistance is needed on a broader front.

The Federal Council, as an instrument for assisting the President in monitoring agency programs, has been of only limited utility. It has worked under the limitations of all inter-agency coordinating com-

mittees of its kind. Where program stakes are high, and agency differences deep, departmental heads have traditionally tried to bypass Council-type mechanisms. The balance of bureaucratic power is weighted heavily against the Federal Council.

*The President does not have enough full-time help from his science advisers.*

Many of the members of the Science Advisory Committee, although serving only in a part-time capacity, spend large amounts of time in Washington on Committee business. The Special Assistant, however, is the only science adviser who regularly works full time. The absence of other regular full-time counsellors narrows the range and variety of technical judgment immediately available to the President.

The lack of full-time Advisory Committee associates handicaps the Special Assistant as well. He serves not only as adviser to the President but also as Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee and Chairman of the Federal Council. He needs more day-in day-out help.

*The President's science advisers lack sufficient staff.*

Today, a single staff of less than a dozen professionals serves the Special Assistant, the Science Advisory Committee and its many standing committees and panels, and the Federal Council. It has been hard pressed to stay on top of its steadily increasing workload.

*Present arrangements create difficulties in Executive-Legislative relations.*

As a personal Presidential adviser, the Special Assistant has not been available for testimony before Congressional committees. At the same time, he is the only Executive Branch official whose span of concern encompasses the full range of our government's scientific and technical programs. The Congress has thus been deprived of authoritative commentary on the government's scientific activities from an over-all, rather than departmental, point of view.

#### A SCIENCE UNIT IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Moving science into the White House was a forward step. Two Presidents have profited from the help of their own science counsellors. It is now time to consolidate and build upon this advance.

The post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the President's Science Advisory Committee should be made permanent parts of the government—with statutory underpinning. The Administration should now consider the desirability of creating an Office of Science and Technology within the Executive Office of the President.

The Office would be headed by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. He would continue as a Presidential adviser and Chairman of the Federal Council.

The President's Science Advisory Committee would continue in its valued counselling role.

The Office would provide staff support for the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Council.

A science unit in the Executive Office would ratify the institutional and professional advisory role of the Special Assistant and the Science Advisory Committee. It would confirm that their responsibilities to the President correspond to those of Executive Office officials like the Council of Economic Advisers.

### *Duties of the Office*

Like any Presidential staff, the Office of Science and Technology would work on any tasks assigned it by the Chief Executive.

However, it could well be given formal responsibilities in two areas:

First, it would be expected to make continuing recommendations to the President for meeting long-term national needs in science.

Second, it would be expected to help the President coordinate and evaluate agency programs by serving as technical counsellors to him and to the Bureau of the Budget.

In short, the Office would be a staff unit for helping the President "look ahead" and "pull together" in science and technology.

Vesting the Office with these responsibilities would involve amendments to the statutes and executive orders relating to the National Science Foundation. The undischarged planning and evaluation responsibilities of the NSF could be formally transferred in whole or part to the Executive Office science unit. The Foundation would in any event be a valuable collaborator of the Office. It could be asked to expand its activities in gathering and analyzing information about the nation's needs in science. The National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council would be helpful partners in this essential job.

The new Office would provide the Bureau of the Budget with technical staff assistance across a broader front than is now the case.

The Federal Council for Science and Technology would continue to lend a hand in program coordination. Where the departments are in general agreement on program goals and agency assignments, the Council can help adjust lesser inter-agency disputes and encourage joint action by the departments. Also the Council can be helpful in getting the word around and in serving as a clearinghouse for exchanging information about agency plans and programs.

### *Full-time science advisers*

The President's Special Assistant, as Director of the Office, could be given one, or preferably two, full-time deputies. Serving perhaps for one or two years, they should preferably be drawn from among the members of the Science Advisory Committee.

Like any other Presidential staff aide, the director of the science unit would have the job of making sure that the President is never isolated from the full flavor of debate and controversy on important issues in dispute. He would be expected to see that many channels of scientific advice are open to the President, and to make sure that all significant points of view on major problems reach his chief.

The presence of full-time deputies, coming from different scientific disciplines and with different backgrounds and outlooks, would make this task easier. The deputies could at the same time take on part of the heavy workload of the Special Assistant.

### *Staffing*

The new Office would require a somewhat larger staff than the one now supporting the Special Assistant, the Advisory Committee, and the Federal Council. But only a modest increase is desirable or needed. The additional staff might include outstanding younger men now working in universities, industry or other parts of the government, who could serve on leaves of absence from their regular employers. There would be a double dividend: The Office would

profit from fresh perspectives, and the temporary staff members would receive a unique education in high government service.

#### *The Congress*

As members of the Executive Office of the President, the Director and his deputies could testify before Congressional committees. The experience of Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers shows it is possible for Executive Office officials to appear before the Congress without endangering the privileged relationship that must necessarily obtain in their dealings with the President himself.

Many committees of the Congress would have a legitimate interest in the views of the Director and his deputies. The Congress would therefore wish to exercise restraint in the number of times it would ask these officials for testimony and counsel. The amount of time spent in preparing for appearances on the Hill should never reach the point where the President's science counsellors are hampered in assisting their chief.

#### *The Departments*

Efforts to fortify science organization at the Presidential level must be accompanied by measures to strengthen science arrangements in the departments and agencies.

There has been encouraging progress in improving department and agency technical staffs. The development of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is a notable example.

Much remains to be done. The Department of State and the foreign aid agencies merit special mention. State, despite recent improvements, still does not have a satisfactory level of in-house technical competence. For their part, the foreign aid agencies have been tardy in taking advantage of the contributions which applied science and technology can make to their planning and operations. The new Agency for International Development provides a chance for a fresh start in meeting this problem.

#### *The Importance of Flexibility*

One of the great strengths of existing science arrangements at the Presidential level is their flexibility. The President's science advisers make effective use of *ad hoc* consultant panels, thereby benefiting from the counsel of the entire scientific community. So too, the President's science aides have concentrated on high priority questions, and have shifted their focus of attention in keeping with changing problems and priorities. It would be essential that the new Office also follow a flexible mode of organization and operation. Science at the Presidential level must never become bureaucratized.

#### THE NEXT STEP

The organizational improvements which have been suggested in this report lie well within the authority of the President to act through executive orders and the updated Reorganization Act. Proceeding under the powers of this Act, the Administration should submit to the Congress by next January its considered findings and recommendations for action.



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601-4940/1  
80 JUN 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Study on "Science Organization and the President's Office" by Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery

1. This memorandum is for your information.
2. The subject study reviews and generally endorses the activities of the President's Science Advisory Committee and the Special Assistant. The study endorses the past activities of these advisers. The only objection seems to be that they could do even more than they are presently accomplishing both in coordinating Government scientific activities and in assisting the Bureau of the Budget.
3. The major change proposed was the creation of an Office of Science and Technology within the Executive Office of the President. Since I am not an expert on Government bureaucracy, I find it rather difficult to see what would be gained by this change in locale and the formalizing of the present arrangement in this fashion. In fact, I believe there might be some dangers to such formalization since it could in time decrease the flexibility of the present set up.
4. The study does recommend the creation of one or two more additional deputy science adviser posts to spread the load on the



Science Adviser himself. It also recommends increasing the staff. Both of these recommendations, I think, are definitely in order since the Office is terribly overworked and spread thin for the wide range of problems they have to handle. It is possible that this increase in size of operations might be facilitated if a formal Office of Science and Technology were created.

5. It further recommends that this arrangement would permit the Science Adviser to testify before Congress. In some respects this would be a good feature but in others it could be quite dangerous in view of the necessary close relations which must exist between the President and his Science Assistant for Science and Technology. However, there is a very real need for improved understanding of scientific policy decisions on the part of Congress. This might be covered under the existing system by having the Special Assistant brief Congress in his role as Chairman of the Federal Council on Science and Technology.



HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles:

This has the approval of  who  
is acting Inspector General.

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23 June 61  
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